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Abstract  
This research report analyses the effects of EU emissions trading schemes on the 
Nordic energy intensive industries. We employ simulations with a modified 
version of the dynamic GTAP-model and a long-run baseline, constructed 
particularly for analysis of energy and climate policy. The analysis covers CO2 
mitigation costs and their impacts on industry competitiveness, the risks of 
carbon leakage, and the combined effects from energy efficiency improvements. 
We also evaluate the effect of subsidies allowed in the EU emission trading 
directive to industries for compensation of the loss of competitiveness. 
According to the simulation results, the single most important factor affecting the 
cost of cutting CO2 emissions is economic growth, as it is accompanied with 
increasing demand and price of energy. Other important factors include the 
ambition level and coverage of global climate agreement. For the permit price at 
emissions trading market and for climate policy effectiveness, advances in 
energy efficiency also have a significant impact. Energy efficiency and emission 
reduction targets are intertwined, and the reduction target alone leads to 
significant decrease in primary energy use. Global improvement in energy 
efficiency also reduces world emissions and carbon leakage. Unilateral EU 
policy seems ineffective for global emissions reduction, whereas commitment of 
all Annex I countries has a much larger impact. Subsidies to the EU industries for 
compensating the loss of competitiveness would limit the carbon leakage to other 
regions, and the overall impact on EU economies appears favourable. 
Key words: competitiveness, emission trading, mitigation costs, carbon leakage 
JEL classification numbers: F14 , H23, C68 
 
Tiivistelmä 
Tässä tutkimusraportissa analysoidaan EU:n päästökauppajärjestelmien vaiku-
tuksia Pohjoismaiden energiaintensiivisille teollisuudenaloille. Analyysissä hyö-
dynnetään simulaatioita dynaamisesta GTAP-mallista kehitetyllä versiolla sekä 
pitkän ajan perusuralla, jotka on laadittu erityisesti energia- ja ilmastopolitiikka-
kysymysten arviointia varten. Tarkastelu kattaa hiilidioksidipäästöjen rajoittami-
sen kustannukset ja vaikutukset eri teollisuudenalojen kilpailukyvylle, mahdolli-
sen hiilivuodon sekä yhteisvaikutukset energiatehokkuuden parannusten kanssa. 
Tutkimuksessa arvioidaan myös EU:n päästökauppadirektiivin sallimien, kilpai-
lukyvyn heikkenemistä kompensoivien tukien vaikutuksia. 
Simulaatiotulosten mukaan tärkein hiilidioksidipäästöjen vähentämisen kustan-
nuksiin vaikuttava tekijä on talouskasvu, joka johtaa korkeampaan energian 
kysyntään ja hintaan. Muita tärkeitä tekijöitä ovat globaalin ilmastosopimuksen 
tavoitetaso ja kattavuus. Myös energiatehokkuuden paranemisella on 
huomattavia vaikutuksia päästöoikeuden hintaan päästökauppamarkkinoilla ja 
ilmastopolitiikan vaikuttavuuteen. Energiatehokkuus- ja päästövähen-
nystavoitteet ovat osittain päällekkäisiä, ja päästövähennystavoitteen toteutumi-
nen yksinään johtaa huomattavaan primäärienergian käytön laskuun. Maailman-
laajuisesti toteutuva energiatehokkuuden paraneminen myös vähentää koko maa-
ilman päästöjä ja hiilivuotoa. Koko maailman yhteenlaskettuja päästöjä tarkas-
teltaessa EU:n yksipuolinen ilmastopolitiikka vaikuttaa tehottomalta, kun taas 
kaikki Annex I - maat kattavalla politiikalla on selvästi suurempi vaikutus. Kil-
pailukyvyn heikkenemistä kompensoivat tuet EU-maiden teollisuudelle vähentäi-
sivät hiilivuotoa, ja niiden kokonaistaloudelliset vaikutukset näyttävät suotuisilta. 
Asiasanat: kilpailukyky, päästökauppa, kustannustehokkuus, hiilivuoto 
JEL-luokittelu: F14 , H23, C68 
Executive summary 
This research report commissioned by the Nordic Council of Ministers analyses 
the effects of EU emissions trading schemes on the Nordic energy intensive 
industries. The analysis covers CO2 mitigation costs and their impacts on 
industry competitiveness, the risks of carbon leakage, and the combined effects 
from energy efficiency improvements. Implications of compensating subsidies to 
energy-intensive industries are also explored. The main findings are: 
GDP growth main determinant of mitigation costs 
• Economic growth is the single most important factor affecting the cost of cutting 
CO2 emissions, as reflected on international emission trading market. With the 
growing world economy, the unit price for emissions increase regardless of the 
reduction target, especially in the long run. 
• Low and even negative growth in past few years affects the CO2 permit prices 
observed in the EU Emission Trading System (ETS). We estimate that without the 
recession (assuming long term average growth rates), the market prices for 
emission permits would presently be about double (up to EUR 30 / tonne CO2). 
However, the long-term impacts of the recession can be even cost-increasing for 
mitigation, and in any case the CO2 market price will catch up as growth returns 
to normal. 
CO2 prices in different regimes: ambition level and coverage of global 
climate agreement 
• The coverage of participation in climate policy plays a considerable role, and its 
implications for the global competitiveness of different industries go beyond mere 
emission costs. With a global commitment, additional emission cuts can be 
achieved at relatively low additional cost, at least the EU’s more ambitious 30% 
reduction target. 
• The importance of the policy ambition level on CO2 price is very high when the 
policy is implemented by only a few countries (Europe). The additional cuts 
become very expensive if implemented unilaterally. Economic recession lowers 
the mitigation costs only in the short run. 
Competitiveness of energy-intensive industries 
• Many industries important to Nordic countries face increasing input costs in the 
period 2004–2020, whilst the world market price of these commodities remains 
virtually unchanged. This implies that whilst production may become more 
expensive, the export revenues do not increase in the same 
proportion. Therefore, especially export-oriented energy-intensive industries are, 
on one hand, at a disadvantaged compared to the foreign (often Chinese or Indian) 
competitors and, on the other hand, provide less profitable use of available 
production factors compared to other domestic industries. 
• In addition to the loss of competitiveness due to CO2 mitigation, energy-intensive 
industries in Nordic countries face fundamental, long-term changes in the global 
competitive environment as the demand increases in developing countries. Labour 
market developments and natural resources typical to Nordic countries also affect 
energy-intensive industries. 
• The economic crisis has undoubtedly accelerated the decline of the heavy 
industries in the short run, but in a longer run, the crisis may prove beneficial to 
the Nordic industries as they can reach relatively better performance in the future 
following the recession thanks to their improved efficiency. Larger global climate 
policy coverage and improvements in energy efficiency would also be beneficial 
to Nordic energy-intensive industries. 
• Facing the tightening regimes for green house gas emissions reduction, the Nordic 
countries have an advantage in the potential for clean energy production, which 
may imply lower energy price increases due to climate policies than in the rest of 
the world. The geographic and natural conditions in the Nordic countries give 
opportunities for energy production using renewable resources on land, along 
coasts, as well as wood and hydro power, and there is also potential for further 
wind and solar power. 
Energy efficiency and technology development 
• Advances in energy efficiency have significant impact on the market price for 
CO2 emissions. We estimate that an additional one per cent annual improvement 
in energy efficiency results in 18 per cent lower CO2 prices in the long run. 
• Effect of energy efficiency on total abatement costs depends on the investments 
required for the increased efficiency. Whether the investments are profitable to the 
industries depends on the investment costs compared to the CO2 market price. 
• Energy efficiency and emission reduction targets are intertwined, and while the 
increased energy efficiency does reduce the CO2 market price, the reduction target 
alone leads to significant decrease in (fossil) primary energy use. Due to the 
economic crises, the 20 % reduction in the use of 
primary energy is achieved almost without further technology improvements for 
energy efficiency. This may increase mitigation costs in the long run. 
Carbon leakage 
• In the developing countries, fast economic growth is accompanied with increased 
emissions, and this increase accelerates with emission reduction policies 
implemented in other regions. However, emissions are growing fast not only in 
the developing countries but also in those Annex I countries not committed to 
international climate policy. 
• Unilateral EU policy seems ineffective for global emissions reduction, whereas 
commitment of all Annex I countries has a much larger impact. Proportionally, 
the total leakage is smaller with a more covering climate policy regime, but in 
absolute terms, increase in the developing country emissions is higher, as the 
emission trading area and thereby its combined CO2 reductions are higher. Carbon 
leakage is estimated to be up to (theoretical maximum) 40 % in EU’s unilateral 
commitments and 25 % with commitment of all Annex I countries. 
• Global improvement in energy efficiency reduces world emissions and carbon 
leakage. Thus, effectiveness of a unilateral policy may improve if associated with 
technology spill-over in energy efficiency and other innovations reducing 
emissions. 
Compensating subsidies to energy-intensive industry 
We were specifically asked to evaluate the effect of subsidies allowed in the EU 
emission trading directive to industries for compensation of the loss of 
competitiveness. 
• A subsidy that would keep energy-intensive industries’ outputs at the levels where 
they would be without emissions trading would cut the carbon leakage to other 
regions by almost half, thereby fulfilling at least part of the original rational for 
such compensatory policy. 
• Subsidy would also impact the overall economies favourably, as the GDP levels 
would be about 1 % higher in 2020 than without the subsidies. 
• The cost of the output to fully eliminate the decrease in output would be about 
4 % of the total value of output at EU level, and 6 % for the Nordic industries in 
2020. The subsidy policy would also imply about 25 % higher price for tonne of 
CO2 at the emission trading market. 
• The present Nordic electricity market setting passes carbon prices fully into the 
price of electricity, which increases the abatement costs particularly in the Nordic 
countries. 
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1. Introduction 
This research report commissioned by the Nordic Council of Ministers analyses 
the effects of EU emissions trading schemes on the Nordic energy intensive 
industries. The analysis covers CO2 mitigation costs and their impacts on 
industry competitiveness, the risks of carbon leakage, and the combined effects 
from energy efficiency improvements. We also evaluate the effect of subsidies 
allowed in the EU emission trading directive to industries for compensation of 
the loss of competitiveness. 
The analysis employs simulations with the GTAP applied general equilibrium 
model and database (see below). In additions for the new scenarios and 
simulations developed for the purposes of this report, the analysis builds on the 
scenarios and results recently acquired in two extensive research programmes: 
The Nordic Energy Perspectives multidisciplinary project (NEP 2010a,b)1
A mini seminar was organized in September 2010 to discuss the preliminary 
findings with stakeholders. At this occasion, presentations were also given on a 
recent ElFi study on the impact of EU ETS in the Nordic electricity market 
(Koskelainen 2010), and on the electricity market design proposed by the Finnish 
Technology Industries. The seminar participants included researchers, 
representatives of industries, regulatory authorities and relevant ministries from 
Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
 
implemented by an international consortium 2007–2010, and the scenario work 
for the Energy Vision 2050 publication (Lehtilä et al. 2009). 
1.1 GTAP model and database 
The world economy simulations employ the Global Economic Analysis Project 
(GTAP) database and models (e.g. Hertel and Tsigas 1997). The standard GTAP 
Model is a multi-region, multi-sector, computable general equilibrium model, 
with perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Bilateral trade is handled 
via the Armington assumption. The dynamic version of the model permits a 
recursive solution procedure, a feature that allows easy implementation of 
dynamics without imposing limitations on the model's size. It includes all the 
special features of the standard GTAP model, such as the sophisticated consumer 
demands and inter-sectoral factor mobility, as well as incorporating a new 
treatment of investment behaviour and additional accounting relations to keep 
track of foreign ownership of capital. 
Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium models are widely used in research 
on long-term energy and climate policies. Whilst a range of models exist, their 
                                              
1  Related publications are available for download at http://www.nordicenergyperspectives.org/reports.asp 
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emphasis is clearly on energy products. For a more general evaluation of energy 
and climate related policies on e.g. evolution of production structures, in 
combination with changes in macroeconomic characteristics, like aging 
population and increased labour skill levels, the GTAP data and Dynamic Model 
provide an appealing tool. However, the latter does not take into account the 
special characteristics of the energy products and the policy instruments such as 
emission trade. 
A modified version of the dynamic GTAP-model (Ianchovichina and McDougall 
2001) and a long-run baseline, constructed particularly for analysis of energy and 
environment issues has been developed. The model incorporates CO2 emissions 
accounting and trading, as well as substitution between alternative forms of 
energy – i.e. crude oil, natural gas and coal, as well as refined fuels and 
electricity – following the principles introduced in the special energy-
environment version of the standard GTAP model (GTAP-E; Burniaux and 
Truong 2002). This includes energy substitution, a key factor in this chain of 
linkages, which is absent from the standard model specification. In addition, 
GTAP-E incorporates carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels and 
provides for a mechanism to trade these emissions internationally. 
The GTAP Data Base is the global data base representing the world economy for 
a given reference year-2004 for the GTAP 7.1 Data Base (updated from 
Narayanan & Walmsey 2008), which has been used in the scenarios presented in 
this report. The GTAP Data Base comprises several types of data: Behavioural 
parameters include elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported 
goods and elasticities of substitution between sources of imports. The main data 
file – derived from regional input-output tables, bilateral trade flows and 
protection data (taxes and subsidies) – represents the world economy as a system 
of flows of goods and services, measured as money values, in millions of 2004 
U.S. dollars. Additional data is also provided on capital stocks, population and 
saving. Since most flows are measured at both tax-free and tax-paid prices, it also 
implicitly covers indirect taxation. On the other hand, it does not include price or 
quantity data, and does not include time series data. The energy volume data file 
contains data on energy purchases by firms and by households and bilateral trade 
of energy products. 
The Data Base includes 117 regions and 57 commodities, and 5 endowments (i.e. 
production factors) land, skilled labour, unskilled labour, natural resources and 
capital. 
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A. “Baseline and macro scenarios” 
Reference case – EU 2020 
• Cutting of CO2 emissions in EU by 20% by 2020 (compared to 1990), trading sectors 
• Improve energy efficiency, cut primary energy use by 20% (for electricity production) in the EU 
• ETS I & II 2004–2012 with annual caps, burden sharing between countries. 
• From 2013 onwards, annual EU-wide reduction by 1,74% 
• Rest of the world has no climate policy commitments 
• Macro variables (Population, Labour force, Productivity growth) follow long term projections. 
• Actual GDP growth rates 2004–2009 and updated projections 2010–2015 
No policy 
• No climate policies 
• Macro variables as in the reference case 
No recession 
• Climate policies as in the reference case 
• Actual GDP growth rates following long-term projections for productivity growth, no cyclical changes 
 
B. “Policy scenarios” 
Unilateral EU -30% 
• From 2013, additional cuts to achieve 30% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 
• GDP can change compared to reference case (productivity growth fixed) 
• Otherwise as reference case 
Global ETS + EU30 
• All Annex I countries engage in emission trading from 2013 
• Annual cut of 1,74% for the whole emission trading area except EU 
• From 2013, additional cuts to achieve 30% reduction in EU’s CO2 emissions (quota) by 2020 
• GDP can change compared to reference case (productivity growth fixed) 
• Macro variables as in the reference case 
EU -20% + subsidies 
• An output subsidy is introduced to keep the energy-intensive industries output at the same levels as in 
No policy case. 
• Otherwise as Reference (EU2020) case. 
 
C. “Technology scenarios” 
No energy efficiency 
• No improvement in energy efficiency in the EU (or other countries) 
• Macro variables and climate policies as in the reference case 
Global energy efficiency 
• Energy efficiency improvement in whole world at the same rate as in the EU (reference case). 
• Macro variables and climate policies as in the reference case 
 
2. Scenarios 
A number of scenarios have been simulated with the GTAP model to assess the 
implications of various possible macro developments and policy options in 
medium and long run. All scenarios are for period 2004–2025, but the results in 
this report are usually reported beginning from 2010. There are no new policy 
measures for period 2020–2025 in any of the simulations, but e.g. emissions 
quotas are assumed to remain at 2020 levels. 
Unless otherwise specified, the results are reported relative to the reference 
scenario that incorporates the European climate policies in place. Reference 
global growth rates follow the actual ones to date and the latest IMF projections 
for the rest of the simulation period. Characteristics of the various scenarios 
studied are as summarised in table 1.  
Table 1 Scenario characteristics 
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The reference case scenario aims at representing the macro-economic driver 
variables and international climate policies in a business-as-usual world. 
Therefore, it incorporates the actual population, labour force and GDP growth 
figures from international sources2
Four exploratory scenarios were simulated to illustrate the impacts of present 
policies, economic crisis, and technological development assumptions. The “No 
policy” scenario has all assumptions of the reference case macro variables 
(except GDP which is a simulation result) and technology change, but 
incorporates no policies aiming at emission reductions. The “No recession” 
scenario, in turn, is identical to the reference case except it assumes long-run, 
steady GDP growth rates for whole simulation period, i.e. considerably higher 
economic growth in 2004–2010. Two alternative technology scenarios differ 
from the reference case in terms of the technological development, namely 
energy efficiency improvement: the “No energy efficiency” scenario has no 
technological improvement in any region, and the “Global energy efficiency” 
assumes that all regions experience a technology improvement in energy 
production equal to the EU in the reference case. 
 until 2009, as well as the latest available 
projections until 2025. The population and labour force projections are same in 
all scenarios, while the GDP growth is determined (endogenously) by the model 
in most policy scenarios. The reference case also incorporates EU’s emission 
reduction commitments and the ETS, and assumes technological development 
required to achieve the 20% reduction in primary energy use. 
Table 2 Annual average growth rates. GDP (reference case) and 
population, % 
 
 GDP  Population 
 2004–2010 2010–2020  2004–2010 2010–2020 
Africa 5,1  6,2   2,3  2,1  
Australia-New Zealand 2,7  3,9   1,0  0,9  
Canada 1,5  3,3   0,9  0,8  
China  10,3 10,4   0,6  0,5  
Russia and rest of FSU 4,3  5,2   -0,2  -0,2  
Eastern Europe 3,2  4,6   -0,1  -0,1  
India 8,4  9,1   1,5  1,2  
Japan and Korea 1,0  3,5   0,1  -0,2  
Latin America 3,7  5,1   1,3  1,1  
Middle-East 4,1  4,5   1,8  1,6  
Other Developing Asia  4,8  6,4   1,5  1,3  
United States 1,5  3,1   1,0  0,9  
EU-15 and EFTA (excl Nordic) 0,8  3,0   0,5  0,4  
Denmark 0,4  3,5   0,3  0,3  
Finland 1,1  3,3   0,3  0,3  
Norway 1,5  2,9   0,8  0,7  
Sweden 1,1  4,5   0,6  0,6  
                                              
2 IMF (2009), EUROSTAT (2008), United Nations (2006), ILO (2008), Carone (2005), Carone et al. 
(2006) 
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As shown in table 2, economic growth is assumed rather high when recovering 
from the crisis. The projections also have high labour force growth (immigration) 
for many Western European countries, which further increases the total GDP 
growth figures. While the work in this study builds on the scenario work in the 
Nordic Energy Perspective project, it has two important differences that affect all 
results. First, as explained above, the baseline growth figures are actual growth 
rates, whereas in NEP, the average long-term growth rates were used also in the 
beginning of the simulation period, which is equivalent to the “No recession” 
scenario in this study. Another enhancement is related to the database, which in 
this study is the recently released GTAP 7.1 with the input-output tables updated 
especially for many European countries and China. On one hand, this is reflected 
by better "base-competiveness" of European countries (more modern 
technology). On the other hand, the updated technology description is also valid 
for China, which is the fastest growing region and one of the most important 
competitors to many Nordic industries. 
Policy scenarios include different options for future EU policy in different global 
regimes. The “Unilateral EU -30%” scenario includes additional cuts in EU’s 
emissions from 2013, resulting in total 30% instead of 20% reductions by 2020. 
“Global ETS + EU30” scenario incorporates a more covering global 
commitment, with additional EU reductions as in the above unilateral policy 
scenario, and reductions in all other Annex I countries. This scenario has 
emission trading between all Annex I countries, and thus the actual emissions 
cuts take place wherever it is most cost-efficient. The “EU -20% + subsidies” 
scenario is simulated to study the costs end effects if the EU industries were 
compensated for the loss of competitiveness due to unilateral climate policies. 
2.1 Commodity prices 
No assumptions are made on the development of commodity prices, which come 
as simulation results in all scenarios (as usual in CGE simulations). World 
market prices of primary energy commodities in the reference case scenario show 
a raising trend until year 2015 or 2016. The increase of the crude oil price from 
2004 base year to 2015 is about 35% after which the price starts to decline, but 
only slowly. European unilateral policies have little impact on world oil prices, 
so the scenarios with various European policy options all show very similar price 
development as the reference case. The natural gas price development is similar 
to oil, though the initial increase is clearly higher. Coal prices follow a similar 
pattern in the beginning, rising swiftly until 2015, but the subsequent decline is 
fast, resulting at the end of the simulation period in prices below the base year. 
Global commitment does have a small but noticeable effect on oil price, making 
it decline faster after 2016. Coal prices are lower than in the reference case 
through the simulation period, with increasing difference towards the end. Impact 
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on gas is much more significant, making it resemble the coal price development, 
and declining sharply after 2015. Global improvement in energy efficiency has a 
uniform, abating effect on all primary fossil energy prices, shown in 1.5% lower 
annual price rice (or greater decline). Compared to the reference case, this means 
15% lower oil, gas and coal prices in 2020. 
Simulated oil and coal prices correspond to historical development and forecasts 
in various sources. Natural gas price in the model, however, is generally higher 
and very sensitive to policy assumptions. 
2.2 Technology changes in energy sector 
The energy efficiency improvements that are assumed in various scenarios are 
given as exogenous drivers, as discussed above. In addition, all simulations also 
incorporate productivity growth. In the model, total economic growth is a 
product of labour, capital and productivity growths, which are all given as 
exogenous drivers except in the reference case and the “no recession” scenario, 
where the growth itself is given exogenously. In the energy sector, a nested 
production structure is modeled with substitution possibilities3
                                              
3 We use substitution eleasticities reported in Beckman and Hertel (2009) 
 between different 
energy commodities, and between aggregate energy and capital. As the energy 
sector description in the model and data is incomplete with regard to non-fossil 
fuel based energy, the capital-energy substitution also represents the switches 
between alternative energy sources. The simulations show that even without any 
climate policies or efficiency improvements, the share of fossil fuel based energy 
in electricity production in all industrialized countries would be from 7 to 13 per 
cent lower in 2020 compared to the base year 2004. 
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3. CO2 emission market prices 
Economic growth is the single most important factor affecting the cost of cutting 
CO2 emissions, as reflected on international emission trading market. With the 
growing world economy, the unit price for emissions increase regardless of the 
reduction target, especially in the long run. While other factors have a clearly 
lesser contribution to the CO2 price, the coverage of participation in the climate 
policy still plays a considerable role, and its implications for different industries, 
namely for their global competitiveness, goes beyond the mere emission costs. 
The market price is also affected to a great extent by advances in energy 
efficiency; however, the total cost effect is somewhat smaller than the market 
price, as the efficiency improvements require higher investments in technology. 
The importance of the policy ambition level on CO2 price is very high when the 
policy is implemented by few countries (Europe), but reduces with more global 
coverage. 
3.1 Economic growth 
As a rule of thumb, 1% global economic growth increases the total cost of 
mitigating a tonne of CO2 by €1
Figure 1  GDP and CO2 price development under global zero emission 
growth and trading. 
 
, due to increasing demand for energy and hence 
higher price for scarce fossil fuel resources. This holds if no technology 
improvement is achieved in energy efficiency. A hypothetical scenario where all 
Annex I countries engage in emissions trading and keep their emissions at 2004 
level, i.e. the trading area has zero emissions growth, shows the close 
relationship with growth and mitigation costs, as illustrated in figure 1. 
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The simulation experiment with actual GDP growth figures 2004–2010 and 
updated medium term forecasts further illustrate the significance of growth: As 
shown in figure 2, the market prices for emission permits are about half 
compared to the baseline simulation with long term average growth rates. 
However, the long-term impacts of the recession can be even cost-increasing for 
mitigation, and in any case the CO2 market price will catch up as the growth 
returns to normal. 
In a recent analysis (European Commission, 2010), the European Commission 
has estimated that carbon price would rise from €14.5 per tonne CO2 in 2008 to 
€25 by 2020. The effect of the recession is evaluated at 30%–50% reduction of 
cost per GDP for the total cost of the Climate and Energy Package 
implementation. The impact on carbon price is not assessed separately. 
We estimate that without the recession (assuming long term average growth 
rates), the market prices for emission permits might presently be up to double 
(about EUR 30 / tonne CO2). A more conservative evaluation for the average 
CO2 price during the whole ETS II trading period suggests €21 per tonne without 
recession as opposed to €12 with actual growth figures4
However, the long-term impacts of the recession can be even cost-increasing for 
mitigation, and in any case the CO2 market price will catch up as growth returns 
to normal. The simulated market prices, reflecting annual marginal mitigation 
costs are presented in figure 2. Indicative average ETS prices are shown in table 
3 below. Assuming that the achieved emissions levels are maintained after 2020, 
the eventual ETS carbon market prices for subsequent periods would be 
considerably higher. 
. Compared to the 
Commission estimate, the GTAP simulations show a considerably steeper CO2 
price increase towards 2020: the average carbon price during the 2013–2020 
period would be €45 per tonne CO2. The most important factor behind the 
differences in the estimates is that the models (PRIMES, GAINS) used in the 
Commission reports do not include world economy endogenously, which means 
that the demand and supply responses outside the EU are not accounted for, and 
the effect of global growth (especially Asia and Southern America) may not be 
fully incorporated. Another difference is that the reference case used by the 
Commission includes all Climate and Energy Package policies, some of which 
are not modeled within GTAP framework (such as renewables target). 
                                              
4 The GTAP simulations do not take into account the possibility of banking allowances nor foresight of 
future policies, which leads to exaggerated annual fluctuations in carbon market prices. Therefore, 
averaging the USD or EUR prices over the whole trading period gives results that correspond better to the 
real life observations. 
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Table 3 Carbon prices. Simulated average prices per tonne of CO2 for 
ETS periods5
 
, € 
Scenario 2008–2012 2013–2020 
Reference - EU2020 11 37 
EU Unilateral -30% 11 50 
Global ETS + EU30 11 44 
Subsidy 12 44 
No recession 18 57 
No energy efficiency 14 59 
3.2 Energy efficiency 
According to the simulations, additional one per cent annual improvement in 
energy efficiency results in 18 per cent lower CO2 prices in the long run. In the 
scenario with no energy efficiency improvement, carbon prices are 30–40% 
higher than in the reference scenario where the efficiency target is met. This can 
also be seen in figure 2. Energy efficiency and emission reduction targets are 
intertwined, and while the increased energy efficiency does reduce the CO2 
market price, the reduction target alone leads to significant decrease in (fossil) 
primary energy use. Thus, differences in energy efficiency improvement have 
only small direct impact on primary energy use, and whether it is profitable or 
not to invest in efficiency improvements obviously depends on the investment 
costs compared to the emissions permit cost. 
Energy efficiency does, however, have further implications to the macro-
economic performance, efficiency of climate policies (carbon leakage), and 
competitiveness of industries, as discussed in later sections of this report. 
With the lower economic growth in the beginning period of EU’s climate policy, 
the 20% reduction in the use of primary energy is achieved almost without 
further technology improvements for energy efficiency. This may increase 
mitigation costs in the long run. 
3.3 Policy participation coverage and ambition levels 
In the GTAP simulations, unrestricted trading of emission permits between 
regions and sectors guarantees the lowest CO2 price at any time as the reductions 
always take place where they are least costly. As shown in figure 2, the Global 
                                              
5 The prices presented are converted from the base data USD values in 2004. As the GTAP model has no 
currency markets and exchange rate fluctuations, the converted Euro amounts are only indicative. For the 
Euro values presented in this report, the exchange rate is set to 1.2 USD/EUR, which corresponds to year 
2004 average. 
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ETS scenarios show clearly lower emission permit prices compared to the EU’s 
unilateral policies. 
With a global commitment, additional emission cuts can be achieved at relatively 
low additional cost, at least the EU’s more ambitious 30% reduction target. 
However, the additional cuts become very expensive if implemented unilaterally. 
In the short run, unilateral additional cuts can be achieved with relatively little 
extra cost because of the economic recession impact, but in the long run, these 
costs will exceed the reference case prices, as illustrated in figure 2. 
Figure 2 CO2 market price. Development of the permit price at emissions 
trading market under different scenarios, % difference to the 
reference case (EU2020). 
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4. Policy effectiveness and carbon leakage 
The simulations also show evidence on carbon leakage. In the developing 
countries, fast economic growth is accompanied with increased emissions. In the 
reference scenario, developing countries account for 77% of total world CO2 
emissions growth in the period 2004–2020. However, emissions are growing fast 
not only in the developing countries but also in those Annex I countries not 
committed to international climate policy. Figure 3 shows the world emissions in 
different scenarios compared to a hypothetical scenario with no climate policies 
at all. The reported leakage figures represent theoretical maxima, i.e. since we 
assume that the technology improvement only takes place in Europe, while 
technology improvements in non-policy regions can significantly reduce carbon 
leakage, as illustrated in the “Global energy efficiency” scenario. Similarly, it is 
assumed that other regions engage in no climate policy measures at all. 
Figure 3 Global CO2 emissions compared to no policy. 
 
 
 
Analogous to the CO2 market price development, the emissions growth is also 
primarily caused by the economic growth. The impact of economic crisis is a 
short-term decrease in emissions, but in the long run, lower investments during 
the crisis lead to an increase in annual emissions. 
Unilateral EU policy seems ineffective for global emissions reduction in the 
model simulations, whereas commitment of all Annex I countries has a much 
larger impact. Effectiveness of a unilateral policy may, however, improve if it is 
associated with technology spill-over in energy efficiency and other innovations 
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reducing emissions. As shown in the “Global energy efficiency” scenario, energy 
efficiency improvement directly reduces emissions. 
Figure 4 shows the leakage as percentage of policy regions cuts, compared to the 
hypothetical scenario with no climate policies. Proportionally, the total leakage is 
smaller with a more covering climate policy regime, but in absolute terms, 
increase in the developing country emissions is higher, as the emission trading 
area and thereby its combined CO2 reductions are higher. With the global 
improvement in energy efficiency, emissions decrease compared to no climate 
policy scenario in all regions, and the carbon leakage in relative terms is reduced 
by 40% . Subsidising energy-intensive industries in the EU to compensate for the 
cost of CO2 mitigation seems efficient in reducing carbon leakage. This is 
discussed further in the later sections. 
 
Figure 4 Carbon leakage. Additional increase in non-policy regions as 
percentage to reductions in the policy regions. Policy scenarios 
with actual growth including effect of crisis. 
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5. Macro economic development 
The emission reduction policies affect macro-economic performance in 
developed countries relatively little even with high reductions in CO2 emissions. 
However, how the distribution of welfare losses are divided between countries is 
greatly influenced by how much of the industrialised world that is covered by the 
climate policy regime. The gross domestic product in 2020 in Nordic countries 
would be about 1% higher with the Annex I policy than in the reference case. 
Energy efficiency improvements are beneficial to the overall economy, and the 
global efficiency improvement is reflected as growth also in the Nordic countries 
in the long run. 
Figure 5 GDP in the Nordic countries. Difference to the reference case 
(EU2020) 
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6. Energy-intensive industries – Nordic 
competitiveness 
Many industries important to Nordic countries face increasing costs under all the 
scenarios in the period 2004–2020, whilst the world market price of these 
commodities remains virtually unchanged. This implies that whilst the 
production may become more expensive, the income earned at world market does 
not increase in the same proportion. Therefore, especially export-oriented 
energy-intensive industries are, on one hand, becoming less advantaged 
compared to the foreign (often Chinese or Indian) competitors and, on the other 
hand, provide less profitable use of available production factors compared to 
other domestic industries. 
The loss of comparative advantage of energy-intensive industries in Nordic 
countries is a long-term trend present in most scenario simulations, and seems 
confirmed by real life observations. Though the economic recession undoubtedly 
has accelerated the decline, there are more fundamental, long-term changes in the 
global competitive environment and local Nordic primary factor markets that are 
affecting energy-intensive industries. However, in longer run, the crisis may 
prove beneficial to the Nordic industries. Figure 6 shows the output of energy-
intensive industries in the Nordic countries compared to the reference case; it 
seems that these industries may reach relatively better performance in the future 
following the recession. A better global climate policy coverage and 
improvements in energy efficiency are also beneficial to Nordic energy-intensive 
industries. 
Figure 6 Crisis and Nordic industries. Outputs per region in the Reference 
case (EU2020) compared to the ‘No recession’ scenario. 
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The role of the economic crises is further illustrated in figure 7 that shows the 
simulated development of chemical industry output in different regions. 
Figure 7 Crisis and chemical industry. Outputs per region in the Reference 
case (EU2020) compared to the ‘No recession’ scenario. 
 
 
6.1 Energy production 
Facing the tightening regimes for green house gas emissions reduction, the 
Nordic countries have an advantage in the potential for clean energy production, 
which may imply lower energy price increases due to climate policies than in the 
rest of the world. The geographic and natural conditions in the Nordic countries 
give opportunities for energy production using land, coasts, forests and hydro 
power, and there is also unused potential for further wind and solar power. 
The model simulations suggest a considerable increase of electricity generation 
especially in Sweden and Norway, which may not be plausible within the time 
frame in reality. This, however, emphasizes the role of clean energy potential. As 
the electricity sector is taking up more production factors, other industries in 
Norway and Sweden tend to decline somewhat, though this is partly offset by 
increased competitiveness thanks to low energy prices compared to other regions. 
In Finland, energy-intensive industries clearly benefit from the Nordic electricity 
market, and overall Finnish energy-intensive industries perform better than their 
Nordic and European counterparts. This result is, however, highly dependent on 
the electricity market: Other simulations with different electricity market 
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specification (see for example the Nordic Energy Perspectives final reports6
On aggregate Nordic level, the results are robust. The electricity market 
specification mostly affects the distribution of industries within the Nordic 
countries. 
) give 
an opposite picture where the Finnish industries are more vulnerable than 
Swedish and Norwegian ones. 
6.2 Policy and technology impacts 
Figure 8 shows the impacts of different climate policy regimes for energy-
intensive industries’ outputs relative to the hypothetical ‘no policy’ case with 
recession in the Nordic countries, rest of the EU and globally in 2020. For most 
industries (with the exception of non-metallic minerals sector), both positive and 
negative impacts on Nordic industries are stronger than to the rest of the EU. 
Looking into more detailed results on output and export responses, we note again 
that the long-term impacts of the economic crisis in the Nordic countries seem 
less negative than in the rest of the world, or even positive. Gains from energy 
efficiency are particularly high in Nordic metal industries and paper and pulp 
sector. 
Figure 8 Impact of climate policies on energy-intensive industries 2020. 
Outputs compared to ‘no policy’ or ‘EU -20% with subsidies’ 
case, adjusted to actual growth rates (including crisis), in 2020. 
 
                                              
6 NEP 2010a,b, and in particular: Niemi & Honkatukia 2010a,b.  
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Figure 9 and figure 10 shows the different energy intensive industries in Nordic 
countries under various policy options and global energy efficiency improvement 
scenario. The results are shown as percentage difference to the hypothetical “no 
policy” scenario (or the output subsidy scenario), and as differences in output 
values (millions of base year 2004 USD). The policy scenarios have similar 
impacts on all four industries: the additional unilateral commitments lead to 
further decreased output, whereas global commitment is beneficial despite the 
higher EU ambition level. The global policy if especially favourable to chemical 
and metal industries, paper and pulp sector benefiting only slightly. Global 
energy efficiency improvement has a mixed effect, as it makes the foreign 
industries relatively more competitive, as the gains from improved efficiency are 
not restricted to Europe. As a result, in the Nordic countries, chemical industry 
shows lower outputs, whereas non-ferrous metals as well as paper and pulp seem 
to gain. 
Figure 9 Impact on Nordic industries 2020 - % difference. Outputs 
compared to ‘no policy’ or ‘EU -20 % with subsidies’ case, 
adjusted to actual growth rates (including crisis), in 2020. 
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Figure 10 Impact on Nordic industries 2020 – difference in millions of 
USD. Outputs compared to ‘no policy’ or ‘EU -20 % with 
subsidies’ case, adjusted to actual growth rates (including crisis), 
in 2020. 
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7.  Subsidy schemes for EU industries 
As illustrated in previous sections, the policies to cut CO2 policies affect the 
competitiveness of the energy-intensive industries in Europe, and in the Nordic 
countries in particular. The EU -20% + subsidies scenario was simulated to 
assess the implications of subsidies to compensate the energy-intensive industries 
for their increased costs due to the CO2 mitigation. 
The simulation was run with an output subsidy that would take industries’ 
outputs at the levels where they would be (according to simulation) without 
emissions trading or other CO2 mitigation measures. The results show that this 
would cut the carbon leakage to other regions by almost half, as illustrated in 
figure 4, thereby fulfilling at least part of the original rational for such 
compensatory policy. It would also impact the overall economies favourably, as 
the GDP levels would be about 1% higher in 2020 than without the subsidies. 
The cost of the output to fully eliminate the decrease in output would be about 
4% of the total value of output at EU level, and 6% for the Nordic industries in 
2020. At the simulated output values for 2020, this would imply a total annual 
cost of 150 billion Euros for the whole EU and 17 billion for the Nordic region 
(including Norway). The subsidy policy would also imply about 25% higher 
price for tonne of CO2 at the emission trading market (see figure 2). 
In the simulation, the subsidy was implemented in the way that would be the 
most efficient for achieving the desired outcome, i.e. as a direct subsidy on the 
production output. However, this type of scheme may not be possible in real 
world in compliance with the WTO rules. Indirect subsidies (e.g. on primary 
production factors) would make the policy less efficient, thus increasing its cost. 
As the present Nordic electricity market setting passes carbon prices fully into 
the price of electricity, which increases the abatement costs particularly in the 
Nordic countries, industries have also suggested an alternative electricity market 
design. This would eliminate the windfall profits at Nordic electricity markets 
and reduce the effect of ETS carbon price on the final market price for electricity. 
It is not possible to implement this design with the simulation tools in use for this 
research, so its implications have not been further studied. 
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8. Discussion 
Simulation results in this study indicate high mitigation costs from European 
climate policies and a negative impact on the competitiveness of energy intensive 
industries in the Nordic countries. It can be argued that the simulation setting 
excludes certain factors that would, in reality, diminish these unfavourable 
effects: countries outside Europe are assumed to take no policy measures to 
reduce their own emissions (except in the “Global ETS” scenario); availability of 
alternative energy form is not fully accounted for; and the technology 
improvements are only given as exogenous assumptions. Climate policy 
measures in other countries would, indeed, affect the competitiveness of the 
European industries favourably. However, as seen in the “Global energy 
efficiency” scenario, the technology improvements that may be induced by 
emission cuts compensate some of the losses (this, of course, is also true for the 
European industries in the unilateral policy case, but the reported results are 
already the net effects). 
Technology improvements that are given exogenously are reflected in the 
simulation results as the additional investments that the industries are willing to 
pay for such improvement. If technology advances are, in reality, available for 
lower cost this will set a boundary to the mitigation costs and carbon market 
prices. In the Nordic Energy Perspectives project, the energy system model 
results, which take such investment options into account, it was estimated that to 
reach the 2 degree global warming target, the CO2 price should rise to 50–90 
EUR by 2040, which is comparable to the scenarios in this study for the period 
until 2020 and would imply CO2 price of EUR 30–45 in 2020. Thus, the evidence 
from these studies suggests that the mitigation costs are nevertheless going to 
increase considerably from today’s level. 
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